Accidental & Essential Properties

An Open Letter on The Problems with Gender Identity

This is something of an open letter to address some important points raised in discussions of “gender identity” with

Hippiesq

, the mother of a gender dysphoric teenage daughter, on both my Substack and that of

Colin Wright

:

Hippiesq: If 'gender identity' were just the degree and specificity of feminine and masculine qualities, it might have some real usefulness in terms of being able to discuss differing personality traits — and maybe that was the origin of the term.

Hippiesq: We are what our biology tells us. That having been said, we each have our own mix of "masculine," "feminine," and more gender neutral characteristics that, as Steersman's quote from me indicates, could be said to be our "gender identity." Such an identity — which could change over time, or even day-to-day, and will change in accordance with differing societies that may consider different qualities as "masculine" or "feminine" — is intrinsic and personal and not subject to challenge.

While the concept of gender identity as “feminine and masculine personality traits” is hardly unique to either of us — for examples, see here, here, and here — we both clearly feel that that interpretation may help to clarify what is manifestly a dog’s breakfast, and the cause for no end of quite unnecessary animosity and grief. Maybe bring some balance to the Forces, so to speak. But a rather acrimonious “debate” characterized by dogmatism, subjectivity, and tone-deafness on virtually on all sides of it.

However, while gender identity is the main “theme” of our conversations, she has, somewhat “problematically”, used the more or less ubiquitous if not infamous analogy between humans, bipedal and otherwise, and those people with various “disorders of sexual development [DSDs]”. In doing a search it has been rather amusing to read the many variations, convolutions, and discussions on that theme in many places, from the “hallowed” halls of Academia to various philosophical blogs to the trenches with Reddit (see below) and Twitter. But as various misunderstandings and misperceptions related to that analogy tend to muddy the discussions of both gender identity and of the definitions for the sexes themselves, it seems somewhat urgent to delve into the rather convoluted details of that particular analogy.

In addition to which, while the conclusions I present depend on the actual premises in play — as is typical in such cases, and notably here on whether one subscribes to the strict biological definitions for the sexes or to the somewhat more subjective folk-biology versions — both of those premises lead to some troublesome conclusions, including a few that illustrate or underline the proverbially problematic consequences of good intentions. While the objective of defending the idea of sex as a binary is entirely commendable — largely the intent of that analogy — misunderstanding those premises and the logic or illogic undergirding it tends to endorse or promote the same slippery slope that leads to “self-identification” and to the consequential butchering of dysphoric and autistic children. “roads to hell”, indeed.

So, without further ado:

---

Hippiesq

, terribly sorry for the delay in responding to your comment on RLS some 10 days ago.

Though, of course, there were some “extenuating circumstances” 🙂. But partly because both you and

Sandra Pinches

had covered a lot of ground which will require some thought and probably several comments to do justice to it. But somewhat en passant, not sure if you noticed her comment about actors getting “so immersed in their assigned characters that the boundary between performance and real self becomes blurred”. Seems to be part and parcel of what you and I were talking about with Woody Allen’s Zelig.

But first off is your more or less justified argument that DSDs don’t refute the definition of sex as a binary, although your use of the “humans are bipedal” analogy is somewhat murkier and maybe less tenable. Not sure exactly where you were going with this but you had said:

Hippiesq: “As I've said before, humans are bipedal. This does not change simply because some people are born with only one leg, or no legs, or perhaps three legs.”

Seems to be something of a common “argument by analogy” that I’ve seen quite frequently, although it is apparently something of a “false” one:

APA: “a type of informal fallacy or a persuasive technique in which the fact that two things are alike in one respect leads to the invalid conclusion that they must be alike in some other respect.”

In passing, I’ve frequently been puzzled by that analogy as it seemed to be based on a number of misperceptions and untenable premises, although it hasn’t been at all clear where the pitfalls are. But I’d found a decent example of it on Reddit — virtually the same as your phrasing and emphasizing its ubiquity — which may bear a bit more analysis, not least because of some of the related comments:

Reddit: “An analogy to binary sex which I find particularly difficult to argue against ... is that humans are bipedal, and the existence of people who can't walk with 2 legs (or don't have 2 legs) doesn't negate the fact that humans are bipedal.”

Part of the problem or misperception there is apparently the implication, premise, or thought that ALL humans are bipedal. Which is, of course just by examples given, simply not true. But a further part of that problem is that most people are unaware of  an important but quite simple principle or perspective from philosophy, i.e., the difference between what are called essential properties and “accidental” ones. 

Fairly decent article on that topic over at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [SEP], at least the introduction is as they very quickly go off into the weeds. “Abandon hope” and all that. However, the opening paragraph or two should be sufficient to get the gist of it.

But the basic principle is easy enough to understand with a simple analogy: the “essential” property of the category “teenager” is “being 13 to 19”. It is absolutely essential to be 13 to 19 to qualify as a member of the teenager category. One can’t reasonably “identify as a teenager” unless one is actually between the ages of 13 and 19 inclusive.

But there is a myriad of “accidental” properties associated with the category “teenager”. As SEP might put it, those are properties that a teenager “happens to have but that it could lack”. For example, many teenagers happen to be tall, short, male, female, white, black, brown or green with pink purple dots — all accidental properties, but they’re not “definitive”, they’re not necessary or essential to qualify as a teenager. Of course some of those accidental properties are more typical of teenagers — raging hormones, poor driving skills, bad skin, dysphoria, etc., etc. But virtually none of them are really unique to teenagers.

Bringing that terminology and framework around to humans, bipedal and otherwise, we might say that “bipedality is an accidental property of humans” — most people are, but many aren’t. In other words, bipedality is a typical trait, but not a defining or essential one. Though it’s something of an ongoing and somewhat fractious debate among biologists as to what that essential trait is for both humans as a species and for species in general. But, to a first approximation, that essential property is having “compatible karyotypes” — basically having 23 chromosome pairs, being able to interbreed, at least potentially, with other members of the species.

So people with one or no legs simply don’t have the accidental property of “bipedality”, but they still have, presumably, the essential property of “human”. Not all humans are bipedal because bipedality is not an essential property of “human”. But, vaguely perceived or not, that dichotomy there between the accidental and the essential — when coupled with the fact of people with DSDs — seems to have become something of a “weapon of choice”, even if it’s not a very effective one, against the argument that sex isn’t binary.

However, the issue becomes substantially more murky when that case is used as an analogy with the sexes. The sexes themselves and those with DSDs are then the “target” in both your analogy and the one on Reddit while humans, bipedal or not, are the “source” in it. For example, Ernest Rutherford's model of the atom made an analogy between the atom [target] and the Solar System [source]. And, for reference purposes, see something derived from Wikipedia’s example:

It has the general form A is to B as C is to D. …. For example, ‘Hand is to palm as foot is to sole’.

So in your analogy, you are basically asserting that “humans (A) are to legless people (B) as the sexes (C) are to those with DSDs (D)”. Following suit with Wikipedia, A & B are the source and C & D are the target.

But that then raises the somewhat “thorny” question as to which are the “accidental” and which are the “essential” properties of the sex categories, “male” and “female”, and how those with DSDs might be said to qualify as members of them. Particularly as that “… is to ... as … is to …” phrasing in the generic case is a specification of a common relationship between the parts (A & B, C & D). Which, in the specific case under consideration, is the relationship between categories and members of them and what are the “membership dues”.

Basically, the bottom line is that if we’re going talk about those properties in the context of humans, bipedal or not, then — so as not to be accused of comparing apples and oranges, of engaging in false analogies — we must talk about how they apply to the sexes in general, and about which properties those with DSDs possess.

But that issue is, of course, part and parcel of the ongoing “debate” over how we are going to define the sexes in the first place. For some details of that see my earlier post:

So, given that preamble, we’re ready to tackle how the different definitions for the sexes — strict or folk biology — have a bearing on the conclusions we might get from your analogy, and their logical and social consequences.

Part I; Strict Biological Definitions:

However, IF — and I emphasize the hypothetical — if we go with the standard biological definitions by which to have a sex is to have functional gonads of either of two types THEN those functional gonads are the “essential” properties of those categories. Something from a recent Wiley Online Library article that emphasizes the point that being “reproductively competent” is the entirely general “essential property” that is applicable to all of us:

"Another reason for the wide-spread misconception about the biological sex is the notion that it is a condition, while in reality it may be a life-history stage. For instance, a mammalian embryo with heterozygous sex chromosomes (XY-setup) is not reproductively competent, as it does not produce gametes of any size. Thus, strictly speaking it does not have any biological sex, yet."

From zygote, to embryo, to fetus, to the onset of puberty, none of us, by those definitions, are or were "reproductively competent" — we are not or were not yet male or female; we are or were sexless.

But in that case, most of those with DSDs are, in fact, missing that “essential” property and so don’t qualify as either male or female. In which case we can say that that analogy of yours and Reddit’s is a “false” one. The relationship between the A & the B — legless people who possess the essential property of “human” — is not the same as that between C & D — many of those with DSDs don’t possess the essential properties required to be members of the categories “male” and “female”. You both — again assuming those strict definitions — are creating a false analogy.

Somewhat in passing, those with various DSDs may well exhibit a number of “accidental properties” that are typical of either sex, but those are still not the essential one of “reproductively competent”. Although none of that is to say that they no longer qualify as human since they, and many others in the same boat (about a third of us), presumably still have those “compatible karyotypes”.   

The thing there is that “having functional gonads of either of two types” — i.e., being “reproductively competent” — is, by those standard biological definitions, clearly only an “accidental property” of the category “human”. Although some two thirds of us, at any one time, are likewise “competent”, about a third of us aren’t:

But still, all more or less human, at least by the species definitions. However, that seems to be part of the underlying motivation for rejecting those biological definitions — “Oh migosh! If I don’t have a sex, do I still qualify as a human?!!?” 🙄 Which is sort of the problematic or thorny implication in that analogy — if one’s opponent is, hypothetically, arguing that those with DSDs don’t qualify for membership in the sex categories — ergo, the implication goes, sex isn’t a binary — then that is, the implication goes, tantamount to saying that those with no legs are not human and that those with DSDs are likewise consigned to the outer darkness. “How dare! you!” 🙄

Which is part of the motivation for trying to understand exactly what is happening “underneath the hood” of that analogy, although I have to admit to not fully understanding all of the bits and pieces. But one thing seems clear: that those with DSDs don’t qualify for sex category membership cards doesn’t repudiate the sex as a binary “thesis” — which seems to be some part of the fear undergirding the frequent use of that analogy. It just means that, as the pie chart illustrates, “male” and “female” are not exhaustive categories in the reproduction department; not everyone of us is “reproductively competent”, is “fertile”, has a sex.

Part II; Folk-Biology Definitions:

So the upshot of a misuse of that analogy, again assuming the standard biological definitions, is to try shoehorning the DSD people into the standard sex categories. Which does some damage to those standard definitions — something of a manifest if not glaring contradiction there. Which necessitates or leads to the promotion of definitions other than those standards, all to forestall what is clearly the proverbial “fate worse than death”. Although, as events will show, that is just a case of moving the goal posts as many of those with DSDs still fail to possess any of the “essential” properties on which the success of that analogy depends.

But for an example of the questionable motivations behind some non-standard definitions, see the following tweet by Zach Elliott, an otherwise knowledgeable commentator on the sex categories in general and a stalwart defender of sex as a binary. Of note is his 3 or 4 guest posts on the topic over on Reality’s Last Stand. But that tweet kind of takes the cake:

Since when are “morally problematic claims” allowed to trump solid foundational principles of biology? Galileo and Darwin, along with the latter’s “bulldog” (T.H. Huxley), are rolling over in their graves at such insults. But he certainly seems rather “upset” that those “who differ from the norm” — presumably those with various DSDs — are going to be consigned to the “neither sex” category, shipped off to the gulag ….

However, one can kind of sympathize — no one really likes to be left out in the cold, particularly alone. Though with a third of us in that boat that seems a thin beef. But it’s often kind of important for various medical professionals to be aware of our genetics. For example, this classic case of a pregnant transman:

The New England Journal of Medicine recently reported that a man [!!] gave birth to a stillborn baby. The story is especially tragic because the hospital’s medical staff did not treat the pregnant man [!!] in a timely fashion. Had they done so, the baby might have lived.

What price vanity. And the rot that pandering to it causes even just in our language, and that apart from what’s in our various institutions. For some details, see my:

However, the definitions that Zach has in mind to replace those are still rather “problematic” when applied to that same analogy of yours, Reddit’s, and many others:

And which are virtually the same as the (rather unscientific) definitions touted (sadly) by biologist Emma Hilton (AKA

BeetleBomb

) and presumably those that come in under the heading of folk-biology — even if there aren’t many credible sources publishing any of them:

So, how do those definitions play out when applied to your and Reddit’s bipedal analogy? No doubt there are some DSDs who might possess the “essential” properties that Elliot and Hilton in particular are promoting. But even of those who do, many are rather “problematic” for any number of reasons. For example, consider those with “Complete androgen insensitivity syndrome”:

Persons with a complete androgen insensitivity have a typical female external phenotype, despite having a 46,XY karyotype [and non-functional testes].

Incidence of about 1 in 50,000 or about 6000 in the US, 120,000 world-wide. Not very easy to sweep them all under the carpet.

But that raises a number of thorny questions — which is the “essential” property, and which the “accidental”? Do we have males that look like females, or females with non-functional testicles? Males with cervixes? Can “women” with penises and testicles be beyond the realm of possibility? 🤔🙄

And that’s not the only DSD with some sticky consequences for that bipedal analogy. For example and maybe more fatally for both the bipedal analogy and for sex as a binary, there is about 1 in 20,000 who have “ovotestis” — gonads that are neither ovaries nor testicles. They stopped developing at the fetal stage where they normally turn into one or the other. So are they males AND females? Or neither? No doubt what Zach loses a great deal of sleep over.

Conclusions:

So regardless of whether we start off in that bipedal analogy with the standard biological definitions or with those of Zach, Emma, and folk-biology, we are still faced with some sticky wickets to deal with. We are forced either to come up with other “essential” properties by which ALL of those with DSDs might qualify as either male or female. Or we have to abandon the claim that sex is a binary — those with DSDs in particular being a third sex of many others? Or we simply have to accept that “male” and “female” are not exhaustive categories, that a significant fraction of us are neither male nor female, are sexless.

Parsimony — and many other principles of logic, biology, and philosophy — would seem to weigh in favour of the third option. Too many seem to be painting themselves into some very tight corners by promoting the other two — as I think that bipedal analogy of yours, Reddit’s, and many others illustrates in some quite helpful detail. 🙂